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According to Mednick’s (1962) theory of individual differences in creativity, creative
individuals appear to have a richer and more flexible associative network than less creative
individuals. Thus, creative individuals are characterized by “flat” (broader associations)
instead of “steep” (few, common associations) associational hierarchies. To study these
differences, we implement a novel computational approach to the study of semantic
networks, through the analysis of free associations. The core notion of our method is that
concepts in the network are related to each other by their association correlations—overlap
of similar associative responses (“association clouds”). We began by collecting a large
sample of participants who underwent several creativity measurements and used a
decision tree approach to divide the sample into low and high creative groups. Next,
each group underwent a free association generation paradigm which allowed us to
construct and analyze the semantic networks of both groups. Comparison of the semantic
memory networks of persons with low creative ability and persons with high creative
ability revealed differences between the two networks. The semantic memory network
of persons with low creative ability seems to be more rigid, compared to the network of
persons with high creative ability, in the sense that it is more spread out and breaks apart
into more sub-parts. We discuss how our findings are in accord and extend Mednick’s
(1962) theory and the feasibility of using network science paradigms to investigate high
level cognition.
Keywords: creativity, associative thinking, network science, individual differences, semantic networks
INTRODUCTION
Creativity is one of the few qualities that define human nature
(Lindell, 2010). While in the past, the mental processes enabling
creativity were considered mystical and un-researchable, nowa-
days an ample body of research has been established, permitting
the examination of the creative ability like any other cognitive
process (Dietrich, 2004; Dietrich and Kanso, 2010; Sawyer, 2011;
Abraham, 2013). Dietrich (2004) argues that creativity is not
a special feature of the cognitive system, but rather requires a
variety of classic cognitive abilities such as working memory, sus-
tained attention, and cognitive flexibility. Thus, this perspective
allows breaking down the concept of creativity into specific cogni-
tive abilities which can be measured separately with conventional
empirical measures. One of the areas that have been extensively
studied within the multifaceted concept of creativity is linguistic
semantic creativity. Semantic creativity refers to flexibility, fluency
and originality which results in high-order language products
such as irony, humor, and metaphors (Faust, 2012; Mirous and
Beeman, 2012). Such high-order language products share the
need of the language system to process and maintain multiple
alternative meanings of a concept, including meanings which are
distantly or unusually connected (Cushen and Wiley, 2011). As
such, semantic creativity is realized by the association of seem-
ingly unrelated or distantly related concepts that nevertheless
create a meaningful linguistic expression. Hence, the semantic
network of semantically creative persons may be different than
that of less creative people, allowing for more flexible and novel
conceptual combinations during semantic processing. The goal of
the present research is to quantitatively examine individual differ-
ences in the semantic networks of individuals with low semantic
creative (LSC) and high semantic creative (HSC) abilities.
One of the hallmarks of creativity is that memory is searched
more widely and in a less-defined manner than during every-
day thinking (Bink and Marsh, 2000; Lindell, 2010). Thus, when
describing creativity, Amabile et al. (2005) and Simonton (1999)
note that the larger the number of potentially relevant elements
that are retrieved during processing, the higher the likelihood
that unusual associations or solutions will be generated, and the
larger is the pool of novel ideas from which to choose. Recent
reviews on creative thinking support this claim by emphasiz-
ing the retrieval of remote associations during creative problem
solving (Helie and Sun, 2010). This view was strengthened by
Friedman and Förster (2002) who presented empirical evidence
that creative behavior can be mediated by a memory search-based
mechanism. Finally, Griffiths et al. (2007) provide theoretical and
empirical evidence to the similarity between memory search and
the Google search engine algorithm. Such search processes are
executed while people engage in semantic creativity tasks, and is
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the basis of Mednick’s (1962) theory of creativity and his Remote
Association Test (RAT).
Mednick (1962), focusing on individual differences in seman-
tic creativity, envisioned the creative process as the combination
of remote associations into new and useful combinations. To
examine his theory, Mednick developed the RAT. In this test, sub-
jects are presented with a triplet of seemingly unrelated words
(e.g., Cottage, Swiss, Cake) and are required to find a single fourth
word that is related to each of these words (e.g., Cheese; Bowden
and Jung-Beeman, 2003). This task is accepted as examining
semantic creativity and has been empirically widely used for its
investigation (Gold et al., 2011; Storm et al., 2011; Mirous and
Beeman, 2012). Investigating the significance of combination of
remote associations, Benedek et al., recently demonstrated the
importance of the RAT in predicting divergent thinking (the hall-
mark factor of creative ability) and intelligence (Benedek et al.,
2012b). Thus, creative ability is highly related to associative think-
ing, a notion that has recently been corroborated in a critical
review of neurocognitive research on creativity (Sawyer, 2011).
Despite the wide use of the RAT to investigate creativity,
some argue against the RAT as a measure of creativity (Taft and
Rossiter, 1966; Lee and Therriault, 2013). These objections are
mainly due to the fact that the RAT is considered a convergent,
and not a divergent, measure of creativity. Divergent thinking
refers to an ideational process which involves generating a broad
range of solutions or ideas to a given stimuli and is considered
the hallmark of creative ability (Runco and Acar, 2012; Lee and
Therriault, 2013). Convergent thinking, on the other hand, is
considered a deductive process that involves systematically apply-
ing rules to arrive at a single, correct solution (Brophy, 2001;
Lee and Therriault, 2013). As the RAT measures the success of
a participant to find the single correct solution, it is considered a
convergent test of creativity. However, Taft and Rossiter (1966)
examined whether the RAT measures divergent or convergent
modes of thought, by having participants complete the RAT with
other convergent (such as school achievement and verbal IQ)
and divergent (such as ideational and word fluency) measures.
While the authors show how the RAT highly correlated with the
convergent measures (measured by IQ and achievement scores),
they also found significant correlations between the RAT and the
divergent measures (measured by flexibility, originality, and flu-
ency scores). Thus, it can be concluded from the work of Taft
and Rossiter (1966) that the RAT demands both convergent and
divergent thinking.
Recent studies examine performance in the RAT from a cog-
nitive search perspective (Gupta et al., 2012; Smith et al., 2013).
Smith et al. (2013) view the RAT as amultiple constraint problem,
in which each cue word indicates a different attribute of the tar-
get word. Solving such a multiple constrained problem requires
a two stage process: first, a search for a possible solution is con-
ducted and then this candidate solution is tested against all of the
constrains of the problem to rate the acceptability of the solution
(Smith et al., 2013). Smith et al. (2013) found that participants
solve RAT problems first by selecting a set of possible answers con-
strained by a single cue word at a time. Furthermore, the authors
show how prior candidate answers directly affect the following
guesses, suggesting an associatively connected directed search,
which is in agreements with the spreading activation model
(Collins and Loftus, 1975). By examining the guesses provided
by participants in attempting to solve RAT problems, the authors
focus on the search process required in the RAT and not the end
solution. This perspective may resolve the convergent-divergent
debate of the RAT. As Smith et al. (2013) show, the RAT first
requires a divergent thinking process to generate candidate solu-
tions and then executive functions are required to examine the
acceptability of the solution (see also Klein and Badia, 2014).
Thus, the differences between low and high creative persons can
be related to the structure of their semantic memory, executive
functions, or both. Here we will focus on any possible differences
related to the structure of semantic memory.
Mednick’s (1962) theory of individual differences in associa-
tive hierarchies proposes that creative individuals have a richer
and more flexible associative network than less creative individu-
als. According to his theory (Mednick, 1962), creative individuals
are characterized by “flat” (more and broader associations to a
given stimulus) instead of “steep” associational hierarchies few,
common associations to a given stimulus (but see Benedek and
Neubauer, 2013 for an opposing view). Thus, creative individuals
may have more associative links in their network and can connect
associative relations faster than less creative individuals, thereby
facilitating more efficient search processes (Rossman and Fink,
2010). Gruszka and Necka (2002) examined the priming of close
and remote associations by low creative and high creative persons.
They show how high creative participants may be characterized
by having a more complex lexicon network structure and how
high creative participants may activate a wider range of associ-
ations across their lexicon network (Gruszka and Necka, 2002).
Rossman and Fink (2010) found that creative subjects give lower
estimates of the semantic distance between unrelated word pairs
as compared to less creative subjects, implying that the former
group may have a wider, interconnected semantic network which
could lead to more efficient search process compared to less cre-
ative persons. To date, no direct examination of the difference
in semantic network organization between low and high creative
persons exists. Such examination of semantic memory networks
has been recently become possible through the use of network
science tools.
Semantic memory is the system of human memory that is
responsible for the storage of semantic categories and of nat-
ural and artificial concepts (Budson and Price, 2005; Patterson
et al., 2007). However, the way in which semanticmemory is orga-
nized into categories and subcategories remains an open question
(Rogers, 2008). Recently, this issue is more and more directly
addressed via the application of computational network tools.
Network science is based on mathematical graph theory, pro-
viding quantitative methods to investigate complex systems as
networks. A network is comprised from nodes, which represent
the basic unit of the system (e.g., mental lexicon) and links, or
edges, that signify the relations between them (e.g., semantic sim-
ilarity). This field has greatly advanced in the past few decades
due to technological and quantitative theoretical advances, which
allowed a rapid development of tools and theory to investigate
both structural properties and dynamics of a network (reviewed
in Baronchelli et al., 2013). Of the various network models
developed in network science theory, the network model that has
been widely used to examine complex systems is the Small World
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Networkmodel (SWN;Milgram, 1967;Watts and Strogatz, 1998).
This model has successfully described a wide range of sociologi-
cal, technological, biological and economical networks (Boccaletti
et al., 2006; Cohen andHavlin, 2010; Kenett et al., 2010; Newman,
2010) and is also widely used in studying structural and func-
tional brain networks (Sporns, 2011; Bullmore and Sporns, 2012;
Stam and van Straaten, 2012; van Straaten and Stam, 2013).
Two main characteristics of SWN are the networks clustering
coefficient (CC) and its average shortest path length (ASPL). The
CC refers to the probability that two neighbors (a neighbor is a
node j that is connected through an edge to node i) of a node will
themselves be neighbors. The ASPL refers to the average short-
est amount of steps (nodes being traversed) needed to be taken
between any two pair of nodes. A SWN is characterized by hav-
ing a large CC and a short ASPL. Further structural properties
of such network are the network diameter (D), which represents
the largest path length in the network (and thus related to the
spread of the network). Furthermore, network science examines
the community structure of complex networks (Fortunato, 2010).
Community structure research examines how a complex system,
comprised of many nodes and edges, break apart (or partition)
into smaller sub-networks. This area of research has been pro-
moted, to a great extent, by Newman (2006), who introduced the
notion of Modularity (Q). The modularity measure is a statisti-
cal measure that quantifies how much a network is partitioned
into sub-communities. The larger the modularity measure is, the
more the network is comprised from sub communities (Newman,
2006). The notion of modularity is extensively investigated at
the neural (Meunier et al., 2010; Bullmore and Sporns, 2012;
Hilgetag and Hütt, 2014), and more recently, cognitive (Arenas
et al., 2012; Kenett et al., under review) levels of brain organiza-
tion. Finally, a recent measure has been presented (S), which aims
to quantitatively measure the “small-world-ness” feature of a spe-
cific network (Humphries and Gurney, 2008). This measure is a
ratio of the CC and ASPL and allows investigating how much a
network is “small-worlded,” to the extent that any S-value greater
than one is a SWN. In order to examine the small-world nature
of an empirical network, its statistical properties are compared to
those of a random, null network with the same amount of nodes
and edges (Boccaletti et al., 2006).
At the cognitive level (the level of information processing in
the brain), application of network science tools is also developing,
mainly to investigate complex systems of language and mem-
ory structure (Vitevitch, 2008; Borge-Holthoefer and Arenas,
2010; Chan and Vitevitch, 2010; Vitevitch et al., 2012, 2014;
Baronchelli et al., 2013). In the linguistic domain, lexicons of dif-
ferent languages seem to display SWN characteristics, considered
to be a fundamental principle in lexical organization (Steyvers
and Tenenbaum, 2005; De-Deyne and Storms, 2008a,b; Borge-
Holthoefer and Arenas, 2010; Kenett et al., 2011). Investigating
the complexity of semantic knowledge with network science
allows to uniquely examine fundamental questions such as the
nature of semantic organization (what are the structural prin-
ciples that characterize semantic knowledge?), process and per-
formance (to what extent can human performance in semantic
processing tasks be explained in terms of general processing
in semantic memory network?) and typical and non-typical
semantic lexicon development (Steyvers and Tenenbaum, 2005;
Beckage et al., 2011; Kenett et al., 2013). In fact, network research
in language is slowly shifting from an interest in investigating
the structure of mental lexicons to investigating cognitive pro-
cesses operating on these lexicon networks (Borge-Holthoefer
and Arenas, 2010; Arenas et al., 2012). We have recently intro-
duced a novel approach to the study of semantic networks (Kenett
et al., 2011) that makes use of correlation and network method-
ologies to define semantic similarity between concepts in the
semantic network. The core idea of our method is the defini-
tion of connections between concepts in the semantic network
by the similarity of association responses generated to these con-
cepts, or alternatively, as the overlap of “association clouds.” This
notion is in accord with classic cognitive theory on the organi-
zation of semantic memory (Collins and Loftus, 1975), and thus
differs from standard methods of extracting semantic similarity
based on standard statistical properties (Kenett et al., 2011). Thus,
such amethod is suitable to study the differences between low and
high creative persons, as proposed by Mednick (1962), which are
theoretically found in their structure of associative hierarchies.
A small but slowly growing amount of research investigat-
ing creativity with network science tools is starting to appear.
Schilling (2005) has presented a theory that suggests that insight
problem solving is a result of a successful search throughout
semantic memory network, enabled by either finding “shortcuts”
or by the creation of new links between previously unconnected
nodes in the network. Yet, this theory has not been empirically
examined. Kenett et al. (2011) proposed that the structure of
the mental lexicon constrains cognitive search processes such as
those required in the RAT. Recently, a neural network model has
been proposed aiming to model the dynamics of spontaneous
thought (the spontaneous emergence of ideas), by directly exam-
ining associative processes such as those in the RAT (Marupaka
et al., 2012). The basic assumptions of this model are that all
thought is homogeneous, combinatorial and associative, which
converge withMednick’s (1962) theory of creativity. At the core of
this model lies the idea of a neural semantic network—concepts
in semantic memory are somehow organized together, and this
structure allows spontaneous thought to occur (for more details,
see Marupaka et al., 2012). The authors examine various types
of network models which account for different organization of
semantic memory, and conclude that the best model to describe
semantic memory is the SWNmodel. Recently, Doumit et al. used
this model to analyze the writings of prominent poets (i.e., Dylan
Thomas) and writers (i.e., F. Scott Fitzgerald), by extracting their
associative networks based on their textual corpora which con-
tain a varying degree of creative language (Doumit et al., 2013).
This was done to investigate whether their neural network model
can account for the difference in associative networks of “more
creative” poetic texts vs. “less creative,” more structured, prosaic
texts. The authors show that the “more creative” poet corpora
exhibited a “flatter” associative distribution than the “less cre-
ative” prose corpora (see Doumit et al., 2013). Nevertheless, as
the authors admit themselves, this work is quite preliminary and
requires further investigation. Furthermore, both corpora ana-
lyzed in this research are comprised from skilled and creative
individuals (either poets or prose writers).
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In the present research, we apply a network science method-
ology to directly and quantitatively examine Mednick’s (1962)
theory of individual differences in low and high creative persons.
We collected a large sample of participants who underwent sev-
eral creativity measures and were divided into a LSC and HSC
groups. The approach developed by Kenett et al. (2011) was used
to represent and compare the semantic networks of both groups.
First, LSC andHSC groups generated free associations to 96 target
words. Next, the semantic networks of both groups were calcu-
lated based on the overlap of association responses (“associative
clouds”) between the target words. Finally, we quantitatively ana-
lyzed and compared the two networks to examine any possible
difference between them. We hypothesized, in accordance with
Mednick’s (1962) theory, that the LSC network would be more
modular than the HSC network (higher Q measure for the LSC
network). Furthermore, in accordance with Rossman and Fink
(2010) findings, we hypothesized that the LSC network would be
less condensed than the HSC network (higher ASPL and D mea-
sures for the LSC network). Finally, in accordance with Schilling’s
(2005) theory, we expected the LSC network to be less connected




One hundred and forty-four persons were recruited for the study.
Five subjects were removed from the final sample (three subjects
due to incompliance with the tasks and the data of two subjects
were lost due to technical issues), resulting in a final sample of
139 subjects (47 men, 92 women), with mean age of 23 years
(SD = 2.4). All subjects were Hebrew native speakers, had normal
or corrected to normal eyesight and were right handed, as mea-
sured by the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (EHI; Oldfield,
1971; mean score = 92, SD = 9). Subjects either took part in the
study as partial fulfillment of academic credit or were paid for
their participation. This experiment was approved by the Bar-Ilan
University institutional review board.
MATERIALS
Creativity measurement
Remote Association Test. The RAT (Mednick, 1962) was devel-
oped to investigate individual differences in creative ability (as
described above). In our research we used the Hebrew version of
the RAT (Nevo and Levin, 1978) which contains 25 triplets with
varying degree of difficulty and lasts 15min. The RAT score is the
sum of correct answers given by the participant.
Tel-Aviv University Creativity Test (TACT; Milgram and
Milgram, 1976). This test is a modified Hebrew version of the
Wallach and Kogan (1965) battery of creativity tests (see Kaufman
et al., 2012 for a current review of creativity measurements).
This battery of tests includes several different measures of diver-
gent thinking, which is considered the hallmark predictor of
creative ability (Runco and Acar, 2012), frequently used in cre-
ativity research (Baird et al., 2012). The TACT measures verbal
and visual creativity by producing two scores—fluency (number
of responses provided), and quality (originality and applicability
of response). The test is comprised of four sub-tests—two verbal
(alternative uses and pattern matching) and two visual (similar-
ities and line meanings). Each sub-test lasts 6min and includes
four open questions. The results of both verbal and visual sub-
tests of the TACT were combined into TACT verbal and TACT
visual scores. Fluency score was calculated by counting the num-
ber of different answers, and quality score was determined by
three independent judges judging the originality and applicability
of responses to stimuli for unique answers only, namely, answers
which appeared in only 5% or less of the sample (Milgram and
Milgram, 1976).
Comprehension of Metaphors (CoM; Faust, 2012). In this task,
subjects are presented with word-pairs in Hebrew, which can
either have a literal, conventional metaphoric, novel metaphoric
meaning or are meaningless, and are asked to decide whether the
two words comprise a semantically meaningful expression or not
(Faust, 2012). This paradigm has been used in converging behav-
ioral and neurocognitive techniques to investigate neural and
hemispheric processing of novel metaphors compared to conven-
tional metaphors, literal expressions and unrelated, meaningless
word-pairs (reviewed in Faust, 2012). Recently, a significant posi-
tive correlation between scores on this on-line semantic judgment
task for processing novel metaphors and the RAT has been shown
(Gold et al., 2011). As such, this semantic judgment task provides
a further measure of semantic creative ability (see also Silvia and
Beaty, 2012).
Raven Progressive Matrices Test-Short Version (RSPM-SV; Van
der Elst et al., 2013). In order to rule out any artifacts due to
intelligence (Silvia and Beaty, 2012; Lee and Therriault, 2013),
all participants underwent the Raven progressive matrices test
(Raven and Raven, 2008). We used the shorten version of the
RSPM, which has recently been shown by Van der Elst et al. (2013)
to be a short valid method to assess intelligence, while taking into
consideration age and gender effects on RSPM performance. This
shortened version includes only series B, C and D of the original
RSPM (Van der Elst et al., 2013).
Classifying participants into LSC and HSC groups
The TACT battery of creativity measures was used to classify
the participants into LSC and HSC groups. One possible way
to do so is to divide the sample into quarters, or thirds and
compare the lowest quarter (or third) against the top quarter
(or third) (Altman and Bland, 1994). However, recent objections
have been raised at this method, especially when measuring con-
tinuous variables such as creative ability (Preacher et al., 2005).
Preacher et al. (2005) discuss several challenges of what they term
the “extreme groups analysis,” related to statistical power, effect
size, and group selection (see Preacher et al., 2005). Such con-
cerns call for a more objective method to classify the participants
into LSC and HSC groups. In this research, we used the decision
tree approach, which is a statistical method at analyzing multi-
variate data (Lafond et al., 2009; Galimberti and Soffritti, 2011;
Brandmaier et al., 2013). This approach has been mainly used
in medicine and biology and is now being applied in psycholog-
ical research, among other applications to classify subjects into
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low and high groups (Kopiez et al., 2006; Lafond et al., 2009;
Strobl et al., 2009). Kopiez et al. (2006) used this approach to clas-
sify participants into low and high musical “sight-reading” ability
(i.e., unrehearsed performance of music) groups, based on mul-
tiple independent variables. Thus, the decision tree approach is
an efficient approach when analyzing a construct which has no
comprehensive model to classify into low and high ability groups,
such as creativity (Runco and Jaeger, 2012). Decision trees are
implemented by a family of statistical algorithms that identify
ways to split a multidimensional dataset into branch like segments
(deVille, 2006). A decision tree attempts to predict, based on inde-
pendent variables (for example, different measures of the TACT)
specific classes of a dependent variable (for example, all partici-
pants who received a certain score on the RAT). The dependent
variable can be split into smaller and smaller classes (branches),
till specific stopping rules are achieved (Galimberti and Soffritti,
2011; Brandmaier et al., 2013). Thus, this method strives to find
clusters that represent a sufficient range of the dependent variable
and are separable with an accepted error (Kopiez et al., 2006). This
method derives decisions, or classification rules, which form the
different branches of the tree. Such rules are based on a method
that extracts the relationship between the classes of the depen-
dent variable and certain aspects of the independent variables
(i.e., range of values in one specific variable and another range
of another variable). The values in the independent variables are
used to estimate the likely value in a specific class of the dependent
variable. Once the relationship is extracted, one or more decision
rules can be derived that describe the relationships between the
independent variables and classes of the dependent variable.
In our research, we used the divergent thinking measures
(TACT scores) as the independent variables and the participants’
RAT scores as the dependent variable. This was chosen since
divergent thinking is widely accepted as a measure of creativity
(Runco and Acar, 2012) and the RAT measures another aspect of
creativity, namely convergent thinking, in addition to divergent
thinking, as discussed above. Thus, we reasoned that classifying
the participants by the ability of their divergent thinking scores to
estimate their RAT scores will result in a valid and reliable classi-
fication. In this sense, the decision tree classifier aims to predict
RAT scores via various TACTmeasures classification rules. In this
sense, this approach attempts to classify the participants based on
their TACT performance into each of the possible RAT scores (1–
25) and thus objectively sort participants into a low creative and
a high creative sample. Finally, we will verify the validity of this
classification method by examining the difference in performance
of the two groups on the CoM task, which has been shown to
measure creative ability (Gold et al., 2011; Silvia and Beaty, 2012).
Free association task
The free association task is based on the method used in
Rubinstein et al. (2005), where subjects are presented with a tar-
get word and have one minute to generate as many associative
responses they could for that target word. This method differs
from classical association tasks, where subjects are only required
to generate either one or three associative response to a target
word (Nelson et al., 2004; De-Deyne and Storms, 2008a). This
method is superior to previous methods in collecting association
norms, as it exposes a greater part of the mental lexicon, helping
to statistically strengthen significant associations to target words
within the network (Kenett et al., 2011; De-Deyne et al., 2013).
The target words used in the free associations task were taken
fromKenett et al. (under review). These words were drawn from a
list of 36 categorical norms gathered by Henik and Kaplan (2005;
e.g., fruits, trees, countries). The top 4 high frequency words
from each category were selected. These high frequency words
were then tested for their degree of concreteness by indepen-
dent judges. Only words which were judged to be concrete were
selected. The final target word pool thus consisted of 96 words
from 24 categories (Kenett et al., under review).
Association correlation networks
The association correlation matrix is computed from the associ-
ation data. The correlations between the target word associations
profiles (the associative responses given to the target words by all
subjects), are calculated by Pearson’s correlation. This correlation
is based on the contribution of two parameters—the extent of
similar associative responses given to a pair of target words and
the amount of participants generating these similar associative
responses to these target words. Thus, the more similar associa-
tions generated and the larger amount of participants generating
these association responses to a pair of target words, the higher
the association correlation between this pair of words is. The tar-
get word-target word correlations (or for simplicity association
correlations) for all pairs of words define a symmetric correla-
tion matrix whose (i, j) element is the correlation between target
words i and j.
For example, if a pair of target words are dad and mom we
examine the overlap of associative responses for these two tar-
get words. A possible overlap of associative responses given both
to the target word dad and the target word mom can be fam-
ily (given by a amount of participants to dad and b amount of
participants to mom), home (given by c amount of participants
to dad and d amount of participants to mom), love (given by e
amount of participants to dad and f amount of participants to
mom) and so on. Then, each of the associative responses given
to both target words and the amount of participants generating
these associative responses for both target words is taken into
account, in relation to all of the associative responses generated
to each of the two target words and their standard deviation, to
generate an association correlation between the two target words.
Note that the association correlation was determined on the basis
of the overlap of targets’ responses. If a target words was gener-
ated as a response it was not included in the computation of the
association correlation between these two target words.
The association correlation matrix can be studied in terms of
an adjacency matrix of a weighted, undirected network. In this
view, each target word is a node in the network, and an edge
(link) between two nodes (words) is the association correlation
between them, with the correlation value being the weight of
that link. Since most of the edges have small values (weak cor-
relations), the relevant information about the network can be
obscured. To overcome this obstacle, we make use of the Planar
Maximally Filtered Graph (PMFG; Tumminello et al., 2005) to
construct from the complete network a sub-graph that captures
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the most relevant information embedded in the original network.
This method is based on hierarchical clustering and the resulting
sub-graph includes all the nodes in the network whose edges rep-
resent the most relevant association correlations. To construct the
PMFG the N(N − 1) values of the correlation matrix are ordered
in decreasing rank. Themethod starts from the pair of nodes i and
j, with the highest correlation and draws a link j→i between them.
This reiterates according to rank order where in each iteration, a
link is added if and only if is the resulting graph is still planar,
i.e., can be drawn on the surface of a sphere without link crossing
(Tumminello et al., 2005). Since we are interested in the structure
of the semantic networks, we binarized each association correla-
tion network (by converting all edges to uniform weight = 1) and
analyzed these networks as unweighted undirected networks.
Finally, it is important to note that this method can only exam-
ine group sample networks and is not sensitive to individual
differences of specific participants (see Morais et al., 2013 for a
novel approach measuring individual semantic networks). When
applying this method to compare between two networks (for
example, LSC vs. HSC semantic networks), this method focuses
on how the responses generated to all target words in one group
differ from that of the second group. Thus, if the same target
words are presented to both groups in a free association task,
this computational method analyzes the general difference of the
network structure arising from each complete sample.
Network analysis
To empirically analyze and compare the structural network prop-
erties of the LSC and HSC semantic networks, the nodes in both
networks must be controlled in order to eliminate any possible
spurious results (vanWijk et al., 2010). This was achieved by con-
straining both networks to 96 target words. We did not control
for the number of edges in the two networks. Network param-
eters calculated, with the MatLab Brain Connectivity Toolbox
(Rubinov and Sporns, 2010) were: CC, ASPL, the average mean
amount of edges per node [<k>, van Wijk et al., 2010 and the
network’s diameter (D)]. Furthermore, in order to examine the
network’s CC and ASPL, a random network was created with
the same number of nodes and edges. For this random network,
we calculated its clustering coefficient (CCrand) and its average
shortest path length (ASPLrand). To examine the modularity of
each network, we made use of Newman’s modularity measure
(Newman, 2006) to investigate how each network divides into
sub-clusters of words, by calculating its modularity index (Q).
Finally, the S measure (Humphries and Gurney, 2008) was com-
puted to quantitatively evaluate the small-world nature of each
network.
We also investigated the importance of each node in the
network. In network theory, the importance of a node in a
given network is quantified using different measures, such as the
betweeness measure and eigenvalue centrality (Boccaletti et al.,
2006). Here we used the word centrality measure (Kenett et al.,
2011). The impact of a specific node is quantified as the differ-
ence between the ASPL of the network after removing word i
with the ASPL of the full network. A positive impact score sig-
nifies that after the deletion of word i, the ASPL became longer
than the ASPL of the full network, indicating that this word has
a positive effect on the spread of activation within the network.
We refer to these words as “facilitating nodes” (FN). In contrast, a
negative impact score signifies that after the deletion of word i, the
ASPL became shorter than the ASPL of the full network, indicat-
ing that this word has a negative effect on the spread of activation
within the network. We refer to these words as “inhibiting nodes”
(IN). this method allows us to investigate the effect each node
has on the spread of activation in the network (see Vitevitch and
Goldstein, 2014 for a similar approach).
Statistical hypothesis testing methods to compare between
networks is currently lacking (Moreno and Neville, 2013).
Such methods are required when conducting empirical network
research to determine whether two (or more) networks are sig-
nificantly different from each other or not (null hypothesis).
This lack of network comparison hypothesis testing is mainly
due to difficulties in estimating or collecting a large sample of
empirical networks and only few statistical methods to compare
between networks (see Moreno and Neville, 2013). To statistically
analyze our findings, we used three complementing approaches.
First, we simulated random networks to determine that the net-
work measures calculated for both networks did not result from
a null-hypothesis of a random network. To this end, we gener-
ated a large sample of Erdos-Renyi random networks with a fixed
edge probability (Boccaletti et al., 2006) and compared the net-
work measures to the values resulting from the simulated random
distributions for each measure. Second, we examined whether
differences between the LSC and HSC network measures were
statistically significant by applying the bootstrap method (Efron,
1979) to simulate partial random LSC and HSC networks and
compared these networks. This procedure had a twofold ratio-
nale: (1) if the two networks truly differ from each other, then
any sub-network consisting of the same nodes in both networks
should also be different, and (2) the bootstrap method enables
the generation of many simulated partial LSC and HSC networks,
allowing for statistical examination of the difference between the
two networks. In order to conduct the bootstrapping procedure,
half of the target words (nodes) were randomly chosen. Then par-
tial LSC and HSC networks were constructed separately using
these random nodes, and for each partial LSC and HSC net-
work, CC, L, S, and Q measures were computed. This procedure
was simulated with 1000 realizations. Finally, we analyzed the
difference in the amount of unique association generation per
target word between the two groups. If the LSC semantic net-
work contains more “steep” association hierarchies, as suggested
by Mednick (1962), we would expect that their ability to generate
associative responses to target words would be significantly lower
than that of the HSC group. Thus, for every target word, we exam-
ined the mean amount of unique associations generated by each
of the two groups (LSC and HSC), and statistically examined any
group difference.
PROCEDURE
For the creativity measurements, each participant performed the
four tasks in a Latin square random order. The CoM task was
conducted using the E-prime software (Schneider et al., 2002)
and stimuli were presented centrally to the participant on a stan-
dard CRT computer screen. Subjects were instructed to recognize
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whether the two words created a meaningful expression. The RAT
was administered as a paper and pencil task. The instructions
of the task were presented to the participant and two examples
(not used in the task itself) were given. Participants had 15min
to complete the RAT. The TACT was administered as a paper and
pencil task. The participants completed each of the TACT sub-
tests separately, after they were presented with the instructions for
the specific sub-test. Participants had 6min for each sub-test of
the TACT. The RSPM-SV was administered as a paper and pencil
task. Instructions of the task were presented to the participant.
The free association generation task was conducted via an in-
house Google Application (see De-Deyne and Storms, 2008b for
a similar approach). In this application, each target word was pre-
sented separately with a clock counting down from a minute and
a response box below the target word, where associative responses
were entered via the keyboard. Once one minute elapsed, the next
target word appeared. All associative responses entered by partic-
ipants via this application were stored on the Google App Engine
Server and were constantly monitored. The 96 target words were
divided into four groups of 24 target words per group. Each group
of target words was entered separately to our Google application,
thus creating four separate sub-applications, each containing a
group of 24 target words. Participants were free to complete the
association generation task at their own time and computers,
They were sent the four applications via a single email and were
instructed that each part takes 24min and that once begun they
must complete the whole part without stopping. Furthermore,
they were instructed that they could complete the four parts in
any order they chose. Only participants that completed all four
lists were entered into data analysis. The opening screen of each
of the four applications gave the following instructions: “This is
an association task. In front of you will appear a single word sep-
arately. Please write down as many related responses to this word
you can think of. You will have 60 s for each word. For example,
for the word dad you might write the following responses: mom,
son, family, etc.”.
RESULTS
LOW AND HIGH SEMANTIC CREATIVITY ANALYSIS
Creativity measures correlation analysis
To examine the relations between the creativity measures, we
conducted a correlation analysis between RAT scores, all TACT
fluency and quality measures, RSPM-SV scores and all of the
CoM measures (response times and accuracy for all four condi-
tions). The full correlation analysis is reported in Supplementary
Information Table 1. This analysis did not find any significant
correlations between RSPM-SV scores and any of the other cre-
ativity measures. The correlation analysis revealed a significant
positive correlation between RAT and TACT fluency and qual-
ity scores [r(137) = 0.22, p < 0.008 and r(137) = 0.21, p < 0.012
for fluency and quality, respectively (two tailed)]. This find-
ing positively relates convergent (RAT) and divergent (TACT)
measures of creativity ( i.e., Ward, 1975; Runco and Acar,
2012). The correlation analysis also revealed a negative sig-
nificant correlation between RAT and CoM response times of
novel metaphors [r(137) = −0.26, p < 0.002 (two tailed)] and
a positive significant correlation between TACT quality and
CoM accuracy of novel metaphors [r(137) = 0.18, p < 0.032 (two
tailed)]. These two significant correlations replicate findings relat-
ing creative ability and novel metaphor processing (Gold et al.,
2011).
Decision tree analysis
We applied the decision tree approach on the participant’s cre-
ativity measures data, using the JMP software (www.jmp.com).
In our decision tree, participants TACT measures were used as
the independent variables and the RAT scores as the depen-
dent variable. Classification rules were derived which compiled
various ranges of the different TACT measures in order to
predict the classification of specific participants to the differ-
ent classes of the RAT (25 classes portraying all possible val-
ues of the RAT). These classification rules were then sorted
from classifying participants with lowest RAT scores to par-
ticipants with highest RAT scores. Participants positioned in
the lower tertile of these classification rules were considered
as LSC and participants positioned in the highest tertile as
HSC (Table 1). Participants achieving low RAT scores seemed
to be classified by having a general low TACT fluency score
(<73). They were more specifically classified by various rela-
tions between quality and fluency scores in specific sub-tests
of the TACT (both verbal and visual). Participants achieving
high RAT scores seem to be classified by either having a gen-
eral high TACT fluency score (≥73) or by having a general
low TACT fluency score (<73) combined with low TACT ver-
bal quality scores and high fluency in specific TACT sub-tests
(either verbal or visual). Thus, fluency is not a sufficient fac-
tor in classifying participants who achieve high RAT scores.
Table 1 summarizes the classification rules for both LSC and HSC
participants.
To validate this classification to LSC and HSC groups, we
examined the difference in performance of the two groups on
the CoM task, which has been shown to reliably measure creative
ability (Gold et al., 2011; Silvia and Beaty, 2012). An indepen-
dent samples t-test analysis on the difference in CoM scores
between LSC and HSC groups revealed that the HSC group had
significantly higher accuracy rates and lower average response
times in comprehending novel metaphors as compared to the
LSC group [t(64) = −1.75, p < 0.03, η2 = 0.07 and t(64) = 2.23,
p < 0.08, η2 = 0.05 for response times and accuracy rates respec-
tively (two-tailed)]. Since significant relations have been found
between creativity and novel metaphor processing (Gold et al.,
2011; Silvia and Beaty, 2012), this analysis validates the decision
tree classification to LSC and HSC groups.
LSC and HSC group
70 participants (35 LSC and 35 HSC) completed all parts of
the free association task. In order to match both groups on
the RSPM-SV, from each group two participants with extremely
low (less than two standard deviations in the LSC group) or
high (more than two standard deviations in the HSC group)
RSPM-SV scores were removed. All participants were native
Hebrew speakers, with normal or corrected to normal eye-
sight. Participants received 80 NIS for their participation in
the experiment. While the two groups did not significantly
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Table 1 | Classification rules created by the decision tree to classify RAT scores based on TACT measures to LSC (upper panel) and HSC (lower
panel) groups.















Mean, mean average RAT score of a specific classification rule; count, amount of participants answering to a specific classification rule; Average; average RAT score
of the entire groups (LSC, HSC). TACT_1_F, fluency scores of the 1st TACT sub test; TACT_1_Q, quality scores of the 1st TACT sub test; TACT_2_F, fluency scores
of the 2nd TACT sub test; TACT_2_Q, quality scores of the 2nd TACT sub test; TACT_3_F, fluency scores of the 3rd TACT sub test; TACT_4_F, fluency scores of the
4th TACT sub test; TACT_4_Q, quality scores of the 4th TACT sub test; TACT_Verb_Q, combined quality scores of the two TACT verbal sub tests (1 and 3); TACT_F,
combined fluency scores of all four TACT sub tests; TACT_Q, combined quality scores of all four TACT sub tests.
differ in any of the demographic details (age, education years,
EHI, RSPM-SV), they significantly differed in all creative mea-
sures, in the sense that the HSC group had significantly
higher scores on all creativity measures (RAT, TACT, CoM-NM)
(Table 2).
LSC AND HSC NETWORK ANALYSIS
Preprocessing
In order to analyze the data for each group, we first standardized
the data into a matrix, in which every column is a different tar-
get word and every row is a different association response to a
target word. This resulted in a 32,370 (association responses) ×
96 (target words) for the LSC group and a 42,367 (association
responses) × 96 (target words) for the HSC group.
Since many similar association responses were received for
different target words and due to various typing errors within
the data, we proceeded to a preprocessing phase in order to
construct a matrix where each row was a unique singular asso-
ciation response. This stage entailed two actions—standardizing
association responses (i.e., neighbour → neighbor) and con-
verting plural into singular (i.e., fruits → fruit). Next, all
standardized association responses were organized into a sin-
gle matrix and identical association responses were merged
using the Minitab software (www.minitab.com). In this matrix,
row i is a unique association response given by the entire
sample, column j is a target word and cell(i, j) denotes the
amount of response of associative response i to target word
j. This resulted in a 5557 (unique association responses) ×
96 (target words) for the LSC group and a 7617 (unique
association responses) × 96 (target words) for the HSC
group.
Network analysis
The association correlations networks were constructed from the
association correlation matrices, using the PMFG filtering pro-
cess (as described in section Association correlation networks).
We then calculated different SWN properties of the semantic net-
works of both groups, to quantitatively examine network differ-
ences between them. The values of the different SWN parameters
calculated for the LSC and HSC networks are summarized in
Table 3. To visualize the network we plotted the graphs using the
Cytoscape software (Shannon et al., 2003), and in order to present
the Hebrew target words as the labels of the nodes, we trans-
lated them into English (Figure 1). In these 2D visualizations of
the networks, nodes (words) are marked as red circles and links
between them are marked as blue lines. Since these networks are
unweighted and undirected, the links merely convey symmetri-
cal relations between two nodes. Both the quantitative analysis
of the calculated SWN measures and the qualitative examination
of the network visualization reveal differences between LSC and
HSC networks. First, the LSC network is more spread out than the
HSC network. This is both apparent in the LSC network having a
larger ASPL and a larger D than the HSC network. Furthermore,
the LSC is less small-worlded than the HSC network, as evident in
the S measure. Finally, the LSC network is more modular than the
HSC network, as evident in the Q measure. Taken together, these
findings indicate that the LSC network is more spread out, less
connected and more modular than the HSC network (Table 3).
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Table 2 | Low Semantic Creative (LSC) and High Semantic Creative
(HSC) group details (standard deviations in brackets).
LSC HSC
N 33 (13/20) 33 (6/27)
Age 24 (2.4) 23 (2.2)
Education 14 (1.5) 14 (1.4)
EHI 92.5 (9) 90.7 (9.5)
RSPM-SV 111 (8.5) 114 (8.9)
RAT*** 7 (2.7) 13.2 (3)
TACT F*** 65.9 (15.7) 88 (24)
TACT Q*** 34 (12.5) 50.4 (21)
CoM NM-RT** 1245 (886) 874 (358)
CoM NM-ACC* 0.49 (0.23) 0.6 (0.24)
N, number of participants comprising each group (male/female in brackets);
Age, mean group age in years; Education, mean education years; EHI, mean
Edinburgh Handedness Inventory score; RSPM-SV, mean Raven Standard
Progressive Matrices Short Version score; RAT, mean Remote Association Test
score; TACT F, mean Tel Aviv Creativity Test fluency score; Tel Aviv Creativity Test
Q, mean TACT quality score; CoM NM-RT, mean Comprehension of Metaphors
Novel Metaphors Response Time; CoM NM-ACC, mean Comprehension of
Metaphors Novel Metaphors Accuracy rates. *p < 0.1 for a two-tailed t-test on
the difference between groups; **p < 0.05 for a two-tailed t-test on the differ-
ence between groups; ***p < 0.001 for a two-tailed t-test on the difference
between groups.
Next, we conducted the impact analysis to examine any dif-
ferences between the impact of a specific node between the two
networks (LSC and HSC). The impact score for each node for
each network was independently calculated as presented above.
A Mann–Whitney test analysis on the difference in impact score
revealed a significant difference between the two networks [U(192)
= 3523, z = −2.818, p < 0.005]. When comparing the amount
of negative (impact < 0) and positive (impact ≥ 0) nodes for
the two networks an opposing pattern of negative-positive nodes
in the two networks is revealed. While in the LSC network there
are more negative impact nodes than positive impact nodes, the
HSC has more positive impact nodes than negative impact nodes.
Furthermore, while the negative-positive impact nodes in the LSC
network is more balanced (56–44%), the HSC network has a
high percentage of positive impact nodes (65%). This high rate
of positive impact nodes might indicate more efficient spread
of activation in the network, thus providing another feature
characterizing the difference between LSC and HSC networks.
To statistically validate our results, we applied the network vali-
dationmethods. The simulated randomnetwork analysis revealed
that for both LSC and HSC networks, all four network mea-
sures (CC, ASPL, S, and Q) were statistically significant (all p’s <
0.001). Next, we applied the partial bootstrapped analysis. This
resulted in a sample distribution of 1000 samples for all measures
(CC, ASPL, S, and Q). An independent samples t-test was con-
ducted on each network measure to test the difference between
the bootstrapped partial networks. These analyses (summarized
in Table 4) revealed significant differences between the boot-
strapped sample distributions of all measures, indicating that the
CC of the partial LSC network was significantly smaller than that
Table 3 | SWN measures calculated for the LSC semantic network and










CC, clustering coefficient; ASPL, average shortest path length; <k>, average
amount of edges a node in the network has; D, diameter; CCrand, Clustering
coefficient of random graph; ASPLrand, average shortest path length of random
graph; Q, modularity measure; S, small-world-ness measure.
of the partial HSC network and the ASPL, S and Q measures of
the partial LSC network were significantly larger than that of the
partial HSC network (all p’s < 0.001). Thus, while these differ-
ences were numerically small, they were significantly different and
replicated the main finding that the HSC is more small-worlded,
more condensed and less modular than the LSC network. These
small numerical values probably arise from the partial networks
being small.
Finally, the difference in association responses generated
between the two groups (LSC, HSC) were analyzed by examin-
ing the mean amount of unique association responses generated
for all target words (Figure 2). As can be seen in Figure 2, the
HSC group generated more unique responses than the LSC
group for all target words. Despite this difference the amount
of unique responses for a specific target word was highly cor-
related between the two groups [r(190) = 0.75, p < 0.001]. A
One-Way analysis of variance conducted on the effect of group on
mean association responses per target word revealed a significant
main effect [F(1, 191) = 310.937, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.614]. A sim-
ple effect analysis [corrected for multiple comparisons using the
Benjamin-Hochberg correction (Thissen et al., 2002)] was con-
ducted on the average association responses for a given target
word between the LSC and HSC groups. This analysis revealed
that for 60% of the taget words, there is a significant difference
between groups (all p’s < 0.01), in the sense that the HSC gen-
erated significantly more unique association responses to a target
word than the LSC group.
To eliminate any possible associative fluency contamination on
network structure, we conducted a network analysis based only
on the 10 first associative responses given by a participant to a
target word (Benedek and Neubauer, 2013). First, for each group
a subset of the raw association responses dataset was comprised,
containing the first 10 association responses given to each tar-
get word by a specific participant. Next, we extracted the LSC 10
responses and HSC 10 responses semantic networks and exam-
ined any possible difference between them. This analysis revealed
that the LSC-10 semantic network is less connected, more spread
out and less small-worlded than the HSC-10 semantic network
(Supplementary Table 2). Thus, the structure of the two networks
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FIGURE 1 | A 2D visualization of the LSC (A) and HSC (B) semantic networks. Nodes are the 96 Hebrew target words translated into English. The links
between nodes represents an unweighted, undirected connection between nodes.
based on the first 10 responses was similar to the original structure
based on all responses. The only network measure which differed
was the network modularity, which was lower for the LSC-10
network compared to the HSC-10 network.
DISCUSSION
In the work presented here, we quantitatively examine the
difference in semantic memory network organization between
individuals with LSC and HSC ability. A large sample of par-
ticipants underwent a battery of creativity measures and was
classified into LSC and HSC groups based on an objective sta-
tistical decision tree approach. Both groups completed a free
association paradigm and generated free associations to 96 target
words. The similarities between target words based on their free
association responses were calculated and used to construct the
association correlation matrix separately for each group. These
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org June 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 407 | 10
Kenett et al. Semantic networks and creativity
association correlation matrices were used to model the associa-
tive networks of both groups, thus representing the organization
of the target words in their mental lexicon. This was done to
directly investigate, for the first time, Mednick’s (1962) theory on
individual differences in creativity, by means of network science
methodology.
Mednick envisioned the creative process as the combination
of remote associations into a novel and appropriate product
(Mednick, 1962). He proposed that low creative persons have
Table 4 | SWN measures calculated for the partial LSC and HSC
semantic networks (standard deviations in brackets).
Parameter PLSC PHSC
CC*** 0.68 (0.01) 0.69 (0.01)
ASPL*** 3.19 (0.3) 3.16 (0.3)
S*** 4.53 (1.05) 4.66 (1.04)
Q*** 0.55 (0.05) 0.54 (0.05)
CC, clustering coefficient; ASPL, average shortest path length; S, small-world-
ness measure; Q, modularity measure; ***p < 0.001 for a two-tailed t-test on
the difference between groups. PLSC, mean partial bootstrapped LSC networks;
PHSC, mean partial bootstrapped HSC networks.
“steep” compared to “flat” associative hierarchies characteriz-
ing more creative persons. Thus, high creative persons may
have a more flexible semantic memory organization. Examining
the differences between the LSC and HSC networks revealed
that the semantic memory network of persons with LSC abil-
ity is more spread out (indicated by a higher ASPL), more
modular (indicated by a higher modularity measure) and less
connected (indicated by a lower small-world-ness measure), than
the semantic network of persons with HSC ability. We statisti-
cally validated our results by several complementary methods:
first, we simulated a large sample of random networks to ascer-
tain that the LSC and HSC network measures calculated did not
result from a null-hypothesis random network. Next, we used the
bootstrap method (Efron, 1979) to create a large sample of partial
LSC and HSC networks and statistically examined the difference
between the distribution of networks measures calculated for this
large partial networks sample. This analysis found significant dif-
ferences between the partial-LSC and partial-HSC sample in all
network measures examined (CC, ASPL, S, and Q). Finally, we
examined the amount of unique association responses generated
to each target word by both groups. This analysis revealed a signif-
icant difference between groups, in the sense that the HSC group
generated significantly more associative responses per target word
than the LSC group.
FIGURE 2 | Average unique association responses generated for target words for the LSC and HSC groups. X-axis, 96 target words used in the research;
Y-axis, amount of mean association responses for a target word. LSC, low semantic creativity group; HSC, high semantic creativity group.
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To eliminate any possible associative fluency contamination
on the semantic networks, we analyzed the semantic networks of
LSC and HSC with only the first 10 associative responses gener-
ated by each participant in the group for each of the target words
(Benedek and Neubauer, 2013). This analysis verified our general
network analysis findings, in the sense that the LSC-10 network is
less connected, more spread out and less small-worlded than the
HSC-10 network. The only network measure which seems to be
affected by associative fluency was the modularity measure, in the
sense that the LSC-10 network was less modular than the HSC-10
network. This is in contrast to the results of our analysis of the
general networks, which showed that the LSC network was more
modular than the HSC network. This higher association fluency
for HSC might contribute to the modular structure of the net-
work, leading tomore connections between nodes in the network,
thus lowering the overall modularity of the network. This is in
line with Schilling’s theory (2005), that relates creativity to the
creation of new links in the network. Future research is required
to directly examine the effect of associative fluency on semantic
network structure.
The word impact measure (Kenett et al., 2011) was used to
examine the effect of each node in both networks. This analy-
sis allows to further examine any general differences between the
two networks, but also to examine specifically how each node
affects the spread of activation in the network. This is possible as
this analysis examines the effect of a node on the ASPL, which
is related to spread of activation in the network (Collins and
Loftus, 1975; Den-Heyer and Briand, 1986). The null hypothe-
sis for this analysis is a similar effect upon removal of a specific
node in both networks. A Mann-Whitney test revealed a signifi-
cant difference between the impact scores of the two groups. This
difference further indicates how the networks differ in their struc-
tural properties. Furthermore, a possible dissociation between the
percent of positive and negative impact scores between groups
was found. In this sense, while the LSC network had a more bal-
anced ratio between negative impact nodes and positive impact
nodes (56–44%), the HSC network had a lower ratio of nega-
tive impact nodes than positive impact nodes (35–65%). This
difference presents another feature which differentiates between
the LSC and HSC networks. Possibly, the higher ratio of positive
impact nodes in the HSC network facilitates more efficient spread
of activation within the network, as removal of these nodes raises
the ASPL resulting in the network being further apart.
How can Mednick’s theory be related to network measures?
first, we argue that Mednick’s notion of creativity as a process
of connecting remote associations can be measured by a net-
work’s small-world-ness nature—the more a network is small
worlded, it has a higher CC (connectivity) and a lower ASPL
(distance). Thus, a more small-worlded state enables better con-
nectivity within the network, thus better allowing the connection
of remote associations and bringing about a creative product
(Mednick, 1962; Schilling, 2005). However, a network which is
extremely small-worlded may lead to more inappropriate asso-
ciative relations, thus raising the possibility of semantic chaos
(e.g., loose association in schizophrenic states (see Faust and
Kenett, under review for a theoretical account of semantic net-
work states). Furthermore, Mednick’s theory of “steep” and “flat”
associative hierarchies is related to community structure in net-
works as measured by the network modularity (Newman, 2006;
Fortunato, 2010). The modularity measure quantifies the extent
to which a network breaks apart into sub-communities, in the
sense that the larger it is, the more the network is comprised of
sub-communities. Thus, a high modularity score can quantita-
tively define “steep” associative hierarchies while a lowmodularity
score can quantitatively define “flat” associative hierarchies. To
this end, the semantic network of creative individuals needs to
be highly connected and contain as small numbers of large asso-
ciation clusters (or “attractor basins;” Rodd et al., 2004; Lerner
et al., 2012) as possible (see Cushen and Wiley, 2011, for a recent
support of this notion). An extension of Mednick’s theory on the
difference between the semantic memory structure of low and
high creative persons is the spread of the network. Rossman and
Fink (2010) have suggestedthat the semantic memory network of
more creative persons is more condensed than low creative per-
sons. Our analysis of the structural measures of the LSC and HSC
networks empirically verifies this notion (Rossman and Fink,
2010).
How can the features of the semantic network of HSC bet-
ter facilitate the creative process, including better performance
in the RAT? Based on Schilling’s (2005) theory that insight is a
result of restructuring of the mental lexicon and Griffiths et al.
(2007) findings that memory retrieval is similar to the Google
search algorithm, we propose that the structure of semantic mem-
ory constrains cognitive search processes such as those required
in the RAT (Kenett et al., 2011). Once presented with the primed
words, the subject activates a search through the semantic net-
work to find the adjoining target word. If the target word is weakly
connected or far away from one or more of the primed words, the
search process may not have enough activation strength or “get
stuck” within a strongly connected module of words surround-
ing one or more of the primed words. Thus, the search cannot
be completed. The successful completion of this search process
through the semantic network requires activation of distant asso-
ciations and creation of new connections within the semantic
network (Schilling, 2005), which is more connected, less modular
and more condensed.
Recently, Benedek and Neubauer (2013) examined the asso-
ciative hierarchies of low and high creative participants. This
was done by estimating associative hierarchies based on asso-
ciative strength (relative response frequency). These association
strengths were used to map the gradient of associative gener-
ation in low and high creative persons which represents their
associative hierarchies (see Benedek and Neubauer, 2013 for a
full description). The authors did not find any significant differ-
ence between the associative hierarchies of low and high creative
persons. However, the authors found that the high creative per-
sons differred from the low creative persons in associative fluency
and uncommonnes of associations, which are related to each
other (Beaty and Silvia, 2012). Thus, the authors concluded that
what differentiates between low and high creative persons is not
the structure of their associative hierarchies, but rather executive
functions required to access semantic content. This approach is
in line with increasing literature which shows a tight link between
executive functions and creative ability (Nusbaum and Silvia,
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2011; Beaty and Silvia, 2012; Benedek et al., 2012a; Silvia et al.,
2013). This line of researchmoves away from a bottom–up (struc-
tural) to a top–down (executive functions) difference between low
and high creative persons. Nevertheless, the top–down perspec-
tive of creativity still recognizes the importance of bottom–up,
structural processing in the creative process (Beaty and Silvia,
2012). As Smith et al. (2013) show, the RAT requires a two stage
process—a divergent, spreading activation process to generate
possible solutions and a convergent, executive process to deter-
mine the acceptability of a possible solution. Thus, a full model
of the creative process must account for both bottom–up and
top–down processing which comprise the creative process. In this
regard, network science can provide unique quantitative tools to
examine search processes being commenced throughout a seman-
tic memory network. Currently, few attempts have been made
at investigating, through a network science perspective, cognitive
search processes throughout semantic memory (Goñi et al., 2010;
Capitán et al., 2012; Smith et al., 2013). More work is needed to
incorporate such work in the study of individual differences in
creativity. Thus, the creative process might be envisioned as an
efficient search process being commenced upon a semantic mem-
ory network. This process is both constrained by the structure of
the network and by the efficiency of the search process itself.
A few limitations of this research are related to the small
amount of target words comprising the network (96), This is
due to the time demanding nature of the paradigm (one minute
per word), as larger semantic networks better allow quantitative
examinations (Kenett et al., 2011; De-Deyne et al., 2013). Thus,
future research is required to investigate larger semantic networks
of LSC and HSC groups, to replicate and verify the results pre-
sented here. Another limitation due to the method of extracting
the semantic networks is that it currently can only represent the
network of the entire sample and cannot account for individ-
ual semantic networks. Future research is required to expand
our network approach to the analysis of individual semantic net-
works (see Morais et al., 2013 for such a recent novel approach).
As individual semantic networks appear to be stable and consis-
tent (Morais et al., 2013), we predict that extracting the semantic
networks of individual LSC and HSC persons will replicate the
group findings we show in this work. Thus, we do not expect
the results found in this research to be due to low consistency
between individual semantic networks of participants compris-
ing both groups. Finally, although the LSC network had a higher
modularity score than that of the HSC, this difference was small
(0.62 compared to 0.58), possibly related to the small amount of
words comprising the networks. While this difference was sta-
tistically validated via our bootstrapping methodology, further
research is required with larger semantic networks of LSC and
HSC groups to further examine the modular difference between
these two networks. Future work, which we are currently con-
ducting, will empirically examine how the differences we found
between the semantic memory structure of low and high creative
persons is expressed in behavioral performance and neural acti-
vation. Furthermore, more advanced network analysis is in order
to further elucidate what differentiates between low and high
creative persons from a network perspective. A few examples of
such advanced network analyses are dependency network analysis
(Kenett et al., 2012), network cascading failures (Buldyrev et al.,
2010), and modeling search dynamics in semantic networks.
In summary, we conducted a network science research which
quantitatively validates and extends Mednick’s (1962) theory on
individual differences in creativity. We define Mednick’s notion
of “flat” and “steep” associative hierarchies in network terms
of modularity and show that the semantic network of low cre-
ative persons is more modular than that of high creative persons.
We also relate his notion of creativity as a process of connect-
ing remote associations to network measures of connectivity, in
network terms of small-world-ness state. Finally, we extend his
theory and propose the spread of the network as another fea-
ture which differentiates between low and high creative persons.
Thus, network science allows quantification and examination of
classical cognitive theories, such as Mednick’s theory of creativity
(Mednick, 1962), which were difficult to examine until recently.
Analyses of the structure of semantic memory are revelant to sev-
eral cognitive domains, such as memory, language and high-level
cognition and thus network research such as the one presented
here is crucial to advancing these fields. Further than investigat-
ing and verifyingMednick’s theory, we ground semantic creativity
with semantic memory structure and cognitive search processes.
While we investigate only a specific aspect of creative ability,
this work contributes to the expanding neurocognitive empirical
investigation of creativity.
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